invoking the crimes against humanity existed. Hence the tribunal had to find other sources of law on which to base its jurisdiction. One interpretation was that the Charter of the Military Tribunal codified pre-existing norms, either those under international custom or general principles of law. In the same vein, it has been put forth that the norms pronounced in the Charter stem from the natural law and are therefore higher principles of morality, and thus they do not violate the principles of legality.
18 Judith Shklar has completely rejected any role of natural law in the Nuremberg trials. She writes: "natural law thinking played no part in Nuremberg, where every effort was made to build on the fiction of positive international law envisaged as analogous in its formal structure to the legalistic image of municipal law in matured systems". 19 The problematic relation between the application of international criminal law and the principles of legality is further discussed in Part III of this paper.
Whether or not one agrees with Shklar on the absence of the natural law basis of the jurisdiction, it is useful to examine briefly, before turning into an analysis of the construction of custom by the ICTY, what sources the Nuremberg tribunal invoked in instituting the international criminality of certain acts and more precisely for this study, the sources of customary international law.
C. Customary status of Nuremberg crimes
In relation to war crimes, the Nuremberg tribunal bluntly accepted that the 1907
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 20 was without a doubt declaratory of existing customary international law and could be directly applied in the proceedings.
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In considering the crimes against peace, the tribunal held that prohibition to wage aggressive war had developed into a customary norm that had been codified in the 1928 Pact of Paris (also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact). 27 Ibid., at pp. 347-348. 28 I.M.T., Nuremberg Judgment, at p. 249. In the later case law, it has been held that it is not necessary to establish a link between crimes against and war crimes or crime of aggression: "it is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict [or] any conflict at all"; ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, § 141. discussion on whether crimes against humanity were a new category of offences and hence ex post facto law.
Some of the official declarations made by the Allied Nations during the Second World
War condemning the acts of the Nazis were invoked in the Nuremberg trial as evidence of state practice that a customary norm prohibiting the crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity had emerged. In addition to the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, as an instrument confirming and codifying pre-existing norms of customary international law as well as the tribunal's interpretation of the customary law, the United Nations General Assembly passed two resolutions in 1946 that affirmed the principles of law articulated by the Nuremberg tribunal. 29 These resolutions have been relied on in subsequent cases as further confirming the customary nature of the Nuremberg law.
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If one compares the right of the accused to challenge the legality of the proceedings under customary international law in the Nuremberg tribunal and in the subsequent ad hoc criminal tribunals, there is a definite development, much of which has been induced by the emergence of human rights law that endorses the right to a fair and uncontentious trial. that international law has moved away from state-centralism to a more human-centred approach, and an individual was allowed to raise the issue of primacy. However, the Appeals Chamber did not accept the challenge to primacy dismissing it on the ground that "the offences which, if proven, do not affect the interests of one state alone but shock the conscience of mankind".
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On the other hand, the ICTY has wider jurisdictional basis than the Nuremberg tribunal, despite the notion that it must apply humanitarian law that is beyond doubt customary international law, while it was held in the Nuremberg Judgment that "the freedom of the Tribunal to apply international customary law is limited by its overriding duty to apply the law of its Charter whether or not such law is declaratory of existing international law".
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This judgment means that in Nuremberg trials the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, in which some customary international norms were codified, was considered to be the exclusive source of applicable law, providing an exhaustive list of crimes falling under its jurisdiction. Conversely, the Statute of the ICTY provides the tribunal with wider discretion to determine the substantive scope of its jurisdiction. For instance, Article 3 list crimes that are violations of the laws or customs of war, but adds that the violations are not limited to the list;
and, in Article 5 on crimes against humanity, the last provision of a similar list states that the court has power to prosecute individuals for also "other inhumane acts". international law at the time the alleged atrocities took place, the court, again, would act in conformity with the nullum crimen principle. However, in its case law, the ICTY has engaged in a discussion on the differences of the customary international norms applicable to international and internal armed conflicts and has stated that the international humanitarian law governs the conduct in both international and internal armed conflicts. More precisely, by scrutinising the intention of the Security Council in creating the Statute of the ICTY, and by employing logical and systematic methods of interpretation, the court has concluded that it has jurisdiction regardless of whether the acts took place during an internal or an international armed conflict. 
III. International criminal

B. Construction of customary international law by the ICTY
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held in the Tadic Military Manual. Unlike in some cases of the ICTY that followed after Tadic, the court did not avoid using the traditional vocabulary of custom formation, but used the traditional expressions "state practice" and "opinio iuris".
In many points of the case Furundzija (1998) the Trial Chamber of the ICTY examined whether customary rules prohibiting various alleged offences exist that give rise to individual criminal responsibility. 57 The methods in reaching conclusions varied from point to point. In relation to torture as a war crime the court stated that the "general prohibition against torture has evolved in customary international law". 58 In analysing the evolution of this prohibition, the court refrained from entering into traditional custom formation discourse of Geneva Conventions and the fact that they have virtually universal ratification were invoked as the main source of evidence of the customary nature of torture as a war crime.
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The As the last point, the court referred to the Nicaragua Case 60 of the ICJ, a case that did not concern torture but the formation of custom in international law in general. 61 However, the ICJ had stated that the common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which explicitly mentions also torture, 62 had developed into customary international law.
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In order for individual criminal responsibility to arise there must exist a definition of the elements of the crime. Secondly, once again, Geneva Conventions were referred to in relation of the demise of the rights of the civilians in a situation where they abuse those rights.
Thirdly, after implying that the prohibition of attacking the civilian population is not an absolute proscription, the court mentioned two general principles: the duty to take In relation to the Martens Clause, which the court held to be expressive of customary international law because of the "authoritative view of the ICJ", the court considered that the "principles of humanity" and the "dictates of public conscience", as these has already been formulated in the 1907 Hague Convention, cannot be seen as independent sources of international law. It is noteworthy that the court nevertheless regarded this denial to a relevant issue to be articulated in the judgment, as if to say that according to some interpretation the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience could have materialised as independent sources.
Perhaps the most outspokenly progressive idea in Kupreskic judgment is a reformulation of the 'sliding scale' approach to customary international law introduced by
Frederick Kirgis in an article of 1987. 88 Kirgis had suggested that it is possible to disregard either state practice or opinio iuris entirely if there is a very strong evidence of the other one.
He had supported this 'sliding scale' theory by a notion of reasonableness and moral considerations: "the more destabilising or morally distasteful the activity […] the more readily international decision makers will substitute one element for the other, provided that the asserted restrictive rule seems reasonable". 89 In relation to the reprisal attacks against civilians, the court pronounced in Kupreskic that:
"There does not seem to have emerged recently a body of state practice consistently supporting the proposition that one of the elements of custom, namely usus or diuturnitas 90 has taken shape. This is however an area where opinio iuris sive necessitates may play a much greater role than usus, as a result of the aforementioned Martens Clause. In the light of the way states and courts have implemented it, this Clause shows that principles of international humanitarian law may emerge through a customary 88 F.L. KIRGIS, "Custom on a Sliding Scale", supra note 11. 89 Ibid., at p. 149. 90 Usus = use, experience, skill, advantage, profit, to use, employ, possess, enjoy. Diuturnitas = lasting a long time, of long duration. Results for were found using the Internet version of the Latin Dictionary of the University of Notre Dame: http://archives.nd.edu/latgramm.htm.
illustrate that Professor Cassese, despite rejecting that policy considerations should affect the application of the criminal law, accepts that some considerations, for instance upholding the human dignity, may be taken into account in the decision-making and they should even rebuff the principles of legality. This fluidity also reflects the more general problematic the judge is faced with in evaluating the principles of legality under the nullum crimen principle, such as the value of legal certainty, and not allowing impunity for morally wrongful acts in international criminal tribunals.
A subsequent former President of the ICTY, Professor Meron, has recently taken a conservative view on compliance with the principles of legality in constructing, or creating, customary international law: "in my view the looser, more progressive approach to the analysis of customary international law embraced by dissents -one that would affirmatively engage the criminal tribunal in the development of customary law, rather than simply in its application-cannot be reconciled with the legality principle". 102 From this comment can be deduced that Professor Meron rejects the idea that the judges, here presumably main emphasis being on the ICTY, play a role in the evolution of customary norms. However, Meron accepts that "a more relaxed approach to the identification of relevant customary norms may be justified where a norm in question does not concern the substantive scope of the criminal prohibition, or of the defendant's liability, and thus does not directly implicate the nullum crimen principle". 103 He does not offer any further reasons or analysis on why the method of custom construction should be different in "non-substantive scope of criminal prohibition or defendant's liability" than in the substantive matters, nor explanation on whether it is for the judge himself to determine when "a more relaxed approach" could be resorted to.
Interestingly, nearly two decades earlier, much before being elected as a judge to the ICTY and before there was any indication that such tribunal would be established -Professor Meron wrote that "the tribunals have [thus] been guided, and are likely to continue to be guided, by the degree of offensiveness of certain acts to human dignity; the more heinous the act, the more the tribunal will assume that it violates not only a moral principle of humanity but also a positive norm of customary law". 104 So, it seems that Meron's experience as a judge in the even when no clear legal rule has prohibited the acts at the time they were committed. 112 The Nuremberg tribunal accepted that the principle of non-retroactivity is "in general a principle of justice"
but it could not be invoked to protect the accused as such, because in relation to atrocities, "it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished". 113 From this premise, it could be deduced that the principles of legality -or at least some parts of it-should not be accepted for the purpose of allowing immoral or unjust outcome. However, in contrast to the relaxed approach to the application of the principles of legality endorsed by the IMT, and to lesser extent by the ICTY, it can be presumed that the judges in the ICC are left with much less discretion on this matter, and the Rome Statute unambiguously asserts that "the Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute". 
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The problem has been further elaborated by the ICTY. For example, in the case Furundzija (1998), the Trial Chamber stated that albeit torture is prohibited under humanitarian law, that area of law does not provide a definition for torture as a war crime.
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The court referred to a case decided less than a month previously, Delalic (1998), where
another Trial Chamber derived a definition for torture, which it said was consistent with customary international norms, directly from human rights law. 120 More precisely, the court in 
V. Conclusion
In international criminal law, the decisions of courts play an increasing role in custom formation despite some academic opposition to the active role of the judge in the development customary international norms. In the judicial decisions, resolutions and statements of non- In some cases -for instance, in Tadic 
